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It la vi.d,lya¡read that .. ~ ex eh ana e rate avat_JI 
doo. not in soma •• n.' uork un1 ••• couotr1 ••• o~ehou 8urrender 
their (r •• dom to fLnanca 8xpenditure. by ~on.v er •• tioo' --in 
ather vorda, unleoa th_y aopaha..., coordinat.' th,ir ~on.y 
cra.t Ion pol iele.. The"e are, ho ..... ve". ..veral pO.8tbl. 
meanin¡u al .. l!xed rata ayate. "not uorklna" .b •• nt coordl-
nation. a Ooe ¡a that no .quillbriu~ exista. Another i. th.t 
th. fixed exchanae rata _yet •• ia abandonad. In this paper, 
lo th. context 01 .. simple tuo-country DOdel, 1 atudy th. 
equlibrla oC .everal a~mee io whieh eouotrie. choo ••• ooey 
ereation pollcies. I ahow explicitly that ab •• ot coordlnation 
Cixed exchanae rate ayat.me do nat vork in the •• n •• that 
eith~r the equillbrium 1. undeairabl. io a velfar ••• n •• , or 
an equilibriuPl oC the aaPle involv •• abAndonlna th. flxed rate 
_vatefll, or both. 
The podel use iR a two-country, pure exchanae overl~ppina 
aenerationa modelo Other intertepporal equilibrium4 modela 
~ith no rate oC return domioance acrOS8 curreoele8 display an 
inc~otive lar "loter08tlooal aelanoraae". "o~ever. th_ .imple 
veralana al cash-ln-advance modelo (see Luca. (7), "elpmao 
(lO), Sacaent (25) snd SveoaQon (27» do not provlde any 
vellare looa aeeaeiated with lnflatlon. They. thus, lmply 
unlimited use of ao lnflation tax lo a 11xed exchanae oystam. 
lo the OG ~odel, aince money le used as a atore ol value, 
there la a non-triVial choice between th. loteroatlonal 
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10l1atlon tax and th. di.tortion ere.ted at hoat. Given ~y 
purpoaee, th. axl.tence 01 thi. non-trivial choice and the 
81mpllcity oí th. aodel are lts paLn virtu ••. 
Th. aodel drava he.vl1y on the fra.ework used by kareken 
and U~ll.ee (14) to deBon.trate the 1ndeterminacy 01 ~12lA 
exchenae rateR 11 there are no re.trictions On portfolto 
choIce. A atrateaic approach 10 vhlch countrle.' choIce. are 
mod.lled a. a aame 1. u.ed.· 
Th. paper proceed. e. follo",.. The env 1 romunt (delloara-
phlc., preferenc •• , eodow.,nt. and lnCor.atlonal atructure) 
1. de.erlbed In Sect10n l. lo Seetion I1 ve pr •• ent the 
competltlve mechanlem In vhich 
optl~lz&tlon problema alven 
privato 
the time 
aaenta solve their 
patha oC aovernnent 
aetioo. and In vhlch marketa are required to clear. Sectloo 
JII introduces the "loternatiooal eelAnoraA~" incentive 
prdvldlna th. ea •• of • eoveromaot 
choIce oC an aptlmal eombination 
polieie. in a vorld ulthout capital 
fecina th. non-trivIal 
of monetary and (lacal 
controla and vith th. 
ather aovernment paoslva. Thls ls contrastad vith the compa-
rable choice lor a closod economy. In Section IV the sltu-
atlooe io which aovernmants ~ to ea eh other'. choIce lo 
podelled 10 a non-cooperatlve game in vhlch •• ch aovernpent 
attempta to ~aximlze the ateady atate utility of ita ovn 
representative aaent. Thrae Qamoa are pre8anted, tho Qamefl 
differioa aa to the otrateales available to the ¡overomanta. 
10 a firat ¡ame. both countries are eonatralood to chooae 
ooce-and-for-al1 real aelanoraae choicea cons¡atent wlth the 
• 
maintenance ol a fixed eXCh&oae rate atationary ~onetary 
equilibrium vith peretet currency .ubatitution. In a aecond 
game, aOVaromeot. may abandoo th_ avatem by Chao.loa polie!8S 
vhich imply a U2n~n.fitr( oquillbrlum vith bartar inter-
national borrowlna and lendina. In. third a.pe, ¡av_romeota 
may ab~ndon the .yatea by chao. loa .1thar the ~a~ realme 
or by ~hooolnA an autarkic portColta re¡lme In uhich • country 
hao it8 ovn poney and 18 camplet.ly ¡n.ulated fro~ the ~on.­
tary policy ol the athar CQuntry, ~ vera Ion ol a flexible 
exchanee rata oyat.m. Tha N.~h Equll1brlA a( th ••• aam8., In 
uhich 8kCh player t.k.8 Ita rival' •• ctione •• ¡lven, are 
.n~lyzt,d. 
The rnain resulta .re the lollo~lna. Fo~ the lirat tvo 
Qameo the Naah nquilibriA yi_Id non-optimal alloeatlona, 
either becauoe an iOllationary _ooetary equilibrlum prevail. 
or beeauee eountrlee abandoo th •• Vetem lar th. non-ponetary 
equllibrlum. lhis leaves room lor lnternatlonal eoordlnatlon. 
It i •• hovn that thero alvave exiat a combinatioo ol aonetary 
choicea that provlda Pareto Superior allocatlona to th. N~8h 





it beco~~a th. Naah 
th. aame. In oome caoes a"eh An outcoro. la 
thla paper presenta a ~odel that reproduces 
both the neceaoity lar loternatlonal coordlnation lor a llxed 
rate oy8tem to vork, as ~ell 8. reporductna th. Cact ol 
, 
forelan exchanae control. beloa impoaed as a vay to 10.ulate 
economi.s from externa} lo'fliclenci ••. 
SEcrlON l. rHE HODEL 
There are two countrl •• (h~i. j) coneIstlna oC tvo-perlod 
l¡ved overlapploa atoaratlon.. Theré 18 onlv one perfect 
perlehable ¡ood in the eeonomy. lhe .nvironment i •• tationary. 
and represented by the lollowlna: 
• 
• 
lh. population t. con8tant, Nh(t) = N~ 




U(C'h,e.h)' And .atisfv the 8taod.rd a.8unptioo.~ U 
ia cootinuOu8, tutee dlfferentiable. honothet1e, 
coneave. Let v(c,h/elh) ~ U,/U •. Theo it ie A88umod 
that (i) v) O. v'( O (li) (e,h/e.h) v'/v l -1, 
and U ..... + •• 0notonieaUv a. c ... -t O. For IIO.t ot 
\o/hat 1 do a •• ua~ that CObb-Oouala. prafarane •• 
aiveo by U(e ... ,elh) • C'h • c .... 
The •• prel.ranee •• atlafy tha abov. a •• uaptiona 
aa \,/811 aa other. u.ed ln related lit.ratura and 
th.t v •• hall u •• 1ater on. 
lher. are no produetion 01' atoraae tachno10gi.s 
avaUable. 
Flnally, thore are tvo loflnltelv llved aov.rn.ent., 
oo. In eaeh eountry. The econoay la.t. foraver. All 
the aaeot. hava perleet fore.laht. 
Hotlee that thera 1. no phyaleal aepar.tion, 
01' pr.Cerence. 01' teehnoloaieal differentlatlon 
that ean define a Wcountry". A "eountry" hera 1. 
ju.t. .ubeet of aaeot. that can be taxed by ooly 
ooe ot the "overOl"nte aod for whom ooly that 
aovern~ent eare •. 
In partleular,th8 goveroment vl11 eare about 
the volfare ol a repre.ootatlve aenaration 10 th. 
hletory ol thi. eeonoPly. lo •• tationary aovlronpent 
thia ia done by ~axi.i~io" th. et.ady .tata utll!ty. 
Thl. !mpllea that the aovarn~aot doa. oot take into 
aceount the valfar& of the old .t tiDe t~l. but ot 
tho roat ol the aenarationa frop thol} on. 
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E.eh aovernaent coo.ume Gh(t) unit. of time t 
aood. Yho •• purch~ •• ha8 to be financed e¡ther by 
r&18i08 lUdp-.U$ taxe_ 01' through •• 1anor_ae. 
Eaeh aov.rnaent ha. the monopoly pover of printina Ita 
eountry'. eurreney. At pariod t, the doney ero.tioo 10 eountry 
h vi11 be, lo real terma: 
""(t) - "h(t-1l. h= i • j 
Ph(t) 
vhera Hh(t) ,_ tha .ooey 8upply oí countrv h ~t time t. oí 
piaco. of papor that can be exchaoaod for l/Ph(t) unlt. ot 
tllu t aood io eouotry h (1.e" Ph(t) le tho prle. leve! 01 
eountry h at time t). 
At e.eh period of ti.e, ve ean defino the exehanae rato 
to be 
(1) e(t) :;: 
. Desides mooey ereation, each Qovernment CAn ifflpose 
lump-auu taxeo 01' "ive lupp-aum monetary traoatera. 10 real 
terma r"(t) :;: NhPh(t)V.~(t) vhare Ph 18 par uoit tax (ll Ph<O. 
lt vill be a traosfer). Ue are aasumina hera that taxeo 
are impoaed in tha firot period's eodovmenta. 
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Thft Qovernment bodQet cOhatralnt will be, th.~~(or., 
¡¡iven by 
( 2) HI> ( t) .. "~t:...!.l ... r" ( t) = Gh (t) a 11 t 1 1 
ph ( t ) 
or 
""(t) - ""Ct-U = G(t) - Ntof}"(t) ... ,,,(t) 
PI> ( t ) 
Inltj~lly thera Are M"(O) unlt. al tiat poney ol country 
h h.lfl In an lndeterminat. co~po.ltlon by th_ old at ti •• 
t-l. Uithout lo •• al o_oerality, .... can a.nu~. tb.t tha 
lnltlal oid hold th, original not.. ol th.ir country al 
orlslo. th.t la, ""(O) ~ NI> .~"(O). h=l,J, where ~"(O) ¡. 
th. Btock o( (lat (dome.tic) curraney In tho hande al • 
repreoentatlve oid at tl~o t=1, country h. 
The govornment, beoIdas uolng monetary/flecal poltet8s, 
ha. yet enotber vay to alleet th. bah.vior (and th. v.lfare) 
01 th. privat. aaento. lt can chanaa th. ~~ under whlch 
privat. tradina occur8, by i~po81na portlollo r •• trlctlona 00 
holdina {orelao 8tOC~ ol currency. a. ve11.a trad~ autarkY 
(this viII be called th_ "portfollo autarky" real~.). al" by 
not allo\l1na valued 1lI0ney to exlat, 
economy (01' "non-monetary" realma). 
8ultching to a barter 
Ue can deCine "trade balance" for eountry h to be, at 
time h. tOI' the case uhere there are no re.trlction8: 
( ) ) TB .. (t) 
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Aa va'll ••• 1.ter, thl. "trade bAlanc.~ do •• not re!lect 
mov.~ent. ln the current .ccount, but rather In th, capital 
.ccount, einc6 1t conaieta al lntero.tlonal borro~ina and 
lendina. 
SECUO" I!, COnPETITIVE EQUILIBRIA FOR GIVE" POLICIES 
ln thl_ S.etlon ve aoa1Y%8 th. behavior al tb. prlvato 
8éctor, Qlv«n th. chole. of palie! •• ol th. eovern~ent •. 
Por each po •• lbls choIce oí L!~~. v. .n.ly~. th4 
cOfRpetJ Uve equ.ll 1 bl"h, ••• oclated ...,Uh th. !!..2..n.!.l!!:.y.. or ll~ 
polle! •• that •• eh aovarn •• nt .ay u.,, and that th9 prlv.te 
aaent. take ae alven. 
Th.re are thr •• groupe 01 po •• lbl_ equilibria, oo. por 
each choice of ('e¡iDe: 
nonetary Equilibria: a realme In vhich (iat monjes ae. 
valued and there ara no r •• trictione on porttolio holdlna. ol' 
or. lnternatio.,al borro\lina aod lendina. Under thi. resiloe, 
there la trad~ bet\leeo aenaratione, and betveen Pl8mb~ro of 
dltterent eountrie. in the Dame ¡enaratioo. thi. iD the 
equlvalent to a Mlaie •• z tal re" real~e, but lo whieh each 
Qovernment can aftect th. private sector by the way of mone-
tary and tiReal policles, repre.entad 00 th. choice oí sequen-
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cea G~(t). ah(t), vhich viii pin dovn tbe choice af ~on8y 
areation to aatlaly th. ¡overnment budaet con8traint. 
Non-llIonetarY Eguil1br1'"&: a "0,,itl8 In \Jhich, by Qovu'nn.ent 
choice, tJat ~on.v hao no value. A. w. viii ••• later thi8 
could be i~pl.n..nt.d throu¡h th, .nnaune.ment of • monetary 
of th. 8a~e senoration In dilferent couotrl •• (lotero&tlonal 
borrovina .nd ¡endina ln abarte" ,ooooll.y) but no trad. 
betve.n atoaratlona. lhe aovern.ent can atl11 alfect th, 
never do 80. 
Portfolio Autarkv EgullIbrlAI a reaIRI under uhich each 
couotry aOI. 00 ita ouo, that le, forelan .ooey caonot be 
held dom.atleally and there 1. no borrowina aod lendina 
acroaa th. border. Ue uill di.cua. later vhy the.e two re.-
trlction. pu.t &0 toaether. Ulthin thi. reai~e, the &avernment 
can u.. clo •• d econopv aooetary and flacal polieie. aod/or 
svitch to a nan-monetary reaime. Ue vill ae. that once th1. 
portfolio autarky le cho •• n, the poliey choice vlll aluaya be 
a monetary non-dlatortionary one uhen G~(t) = O. 
1'.'. NONETARY EQUILIBRIA 
Consumer'. problem: GiVen th, relevant prlcea «Ph(t), 
(trane(er) eequellce Ph(t), each repreoeotative coneUmer of 
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country h. seneration t 1. viii chooa. a vector af conoump-
and ensase lo loana 1 h(t) in order to: 
•. t. eh,. E (llI hN(tl/P.(t» + Ih(t) S v'h(l-~h(t» 
k=i,J 
e",+1 
C""C",."III;" .. (t) } O 
t1me t Bood) by conaumer h, and 1+r(t) la th, real returo on 
the (lnternationallv unre.trlctld) privatl loao ••• rklt. 
Notlc6 that, becauae of the tuo-period overlapplna 
aeneratlona atructure and becau.e o( all aaenta beillQ ho~oae-
noua vithin a eountrv, all 10an8 vill take place between 
roembera a( th.!.!!!.!. aeneratlon of di(fereot countl'le •. And, 
becau •• o( there anly belna one aood, a11 trade 1mbalances 
vill be of the capital accaunt type (l.e., lnternatlonal 
borrouina and lendlna). 
FinalIy, ve can eonulder the optlmlzatlon problem of the 
meabera o( ieneration O, old at t+1, vhich J. max U(c~.(O» 
Deflnltion 1: Competitivo Monetary Equillbrlum vlth both 
monieo beina valued and no redtrlctioos (ME). 
, , 
", __ , ,- rr 
" 
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A ME lo a .et 
of eequencu P,(t) P¡(t) r(t) e ( t ) and of alloeatlone 
.ueh that: 
(1) Eaeh coneu.el' 01 aen.ration t ~ 1 tolv •• thelr 
optlalzatlon probl •• (4), takinQ 88 ¡lven th. 
exchanae rAte and policV 
(JI ) 
k. t. 
(lll) lh_ oid at tiNa t=1 .ólv. th.lr (trivIal) 
optlmization probla •. 
(lv) (or both 
eurrencie., namel, 
1'" ( t) NIo(t)/P,.(t), 
Sinca there are no legal restrlctionB on portlollo 
choice, (U) implIes that both currencleo II\U8t ili.!!L_the samo 
real return (domlnance reeult). vhich muet equal th. (real) 
int.reet rate 00 lnternatlonal loaoa, l.e .• 
(5) = P,(t+l) 
P, ( t) 
Note that thIe condltlon, t08etl\.r vith the detioitlon 
01 the exchange rato (1). Implloa (a. an eqtllllbrlum condI-
tioo) conatancy of the exehange rato, l.e., o(t+l) = e(t)=e. 
ThIs wall-known reeult la a cona.quenc. of the abaenee ol 
capItal controlo, and of havin¡ a alnale aood. 
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8e~aU8e ol U_Ira. Lau (Iv) 1~plle8 that the aood market 
i. (uorld-ulde) eleared. uhich obvloU81y i.pll •• TB'(t) = 
-T8J(t), (Note that. In a.neral. Ut uon't 8et • bal~nced 
capitAl aCCo"nt; that le, th1_ modal 1. abl, to atnerat •• 
paraaoent .urplus (del!alt) capital account vith fixed ex-
ehanas rat •• , In .0 eqyilibriuN 81tu&tloo). 
Indeterminancy ol the flexible exchange rate: A. ahovo 
In ~.r.k.n and U.llace (14), ab •• nee ol capital controle ~ak. 
th. (conatant) exchanae rete (tí to be l~ft .~t by uarket 
condltlon.) lndet.r~lnat. 10 th_ (ollovJna .'0.'1 lor .!.~s.h 
po •• lble (unchAnglng) " there la .n (ulH, •• tt'icted) ME. 
Cl.arly th. dlatrlbutlon ol utlllty of th. lnltl.l old depond 
h •• vlly 00 vhleh e Dight hold. 8ut.~ v •• ald belore, the 
Qovaro •• nt viII oot tak. loto account the vallar. ol th,.e 
cltlzene. lhl. lod.t.r~lnacv could bo .0lved elther by "coun-
tr168 aoina on thalr ovo" (capital control., alao call ed 
portlollo autarky reaiaea) or by cooperatIva budaet polielas 
vhere th' (con.t&ot) exchanae rata l. fixed at •. Nickelabura 
(23) h ••• lao .hovo a ca.a vhare th. indetermloancy dl •• ppears 
ur,der • llexible exchanae rat8; vhan thero i. a threat ol the 
governmentB impo.loa a portfollo autarky realme at some 
(either knovO or r'andom) date t+T. 
In what folloV8 I vIII a.8ume that the exchaoge rate la 
flxed (by mutual aareement, or by unilateral .etloo) at •. 
Oeflnitlon 2: A Statlonary Competitivo Monotary Equlli-
l' 
brlum Uith Fixed Exchan"e Ratea (MEF) la • ME 8uch that aiven 
the exoaenoue proc ••• P~(t) • PhI a11 t, hal,J, 
u. ~lll allow barter trad. to take place (ao aentioned 
befo". thi. viII tak. th. lora 01 lnternatlonal borrovlna and 
Here, alnca monl •• hava no value, .nd thera i. onlv one 
aood. th. concapt ofaxchanae rate la u •• ninal •••. Trade vil! 
for aoa. unlta 01 th. lood In th. n.xt perlod). 
al} t ~ 1. el ther bV _"r •• Plent or by unilateral aetloo of on. Hota th_t, In th1. C&a8, th_ aavernm.ot aUbt r •• triot 
ol th. eouot,,! ••. 
mant, but atill taxa. can b. laviad In th. tora al aooda. 
Exhteuca of .\Jch .0 .quillbrluPI Ca •• karaken .nd U.llace 
(13) viII _llova ua to concentrat. on the atationary (at •• dy Consumer'. probl.~: 
atate) .alution. 
Jo overlappina aeneratlon "odel. there i. u8ually .. (6) 
eontinuUD of non-qtationary monetary equillbria ~1th 11"1tina 
real balance. equal to zero. Ho~ever. ve'}} eonalder only 
thoae equillbria vhich are atatlonary. ~hich viII be v.ll-
delinad aiven our atatlonary .nviron~ent. uhere 1 • rNn(t) iD th. rate ol return on th. loans narket in 
the no.n-Ilonatary raailu. 
11.2. NON-MONETARY EQUILIDRIA 
Tha optlnlzation probl.1l ol the membara of gen.ratlon O 
A non-cnonetal'y rea!'" can be dellnad •• an equllibrluPl 
aituation vhere flat 1l0Ri •• are worthl ••• , namely l/Ph(t) = O 
for Borne t. (Note ttlat if l/P~(t.l) O for Don. h. th.n Finally. the govornment budget eonetraint lo; 
l/P~(t) ~ O tal' that h. sinee thore is perC.ct Core.ight). 
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N"Ilr.(t)"" ... G(t). h"'i,L al} t ~ 1. 
geflnition 4: Non-Monetary equllibrlulII (NME) 
Far éach palr of •• q~c.Q Ip,(t) I PJ(t)}. 
eequence r~"(t) and of .lloe.tiona 8uch that: 
• NME le a 
( I ) Eaeh coneumer o( a8naration t ~ 1 .olva thair 
optl1ll1zatlon problem (6), takina •• alven th. 
palier parnlllotere and th. rat. 01 ['.tu"n on 
1 oano. 
(11 ) Old at time t=1 sol ve thelr optl~lzatlon 
'. 
pl'oblea. 
(111 ) lntern.tlonal 10.n8 narket cleara perlod by 
period, naPloly. t h l"(t) = O. ¡tll t } 1. 
Abaence o( port(ollo restrlctlona and exi.teoee oC the 
loteroatlonal 10ana park&t maka ratea oí returo ~~ual acroa. 
couotrlen. and thereCore a mooetary equIIIbriu" io Olle country 
cannot coexl.t vlth a non-pon.tary equllibrlum In the other. 
11. 3, PORTFOLIO AUTARKY EQUILIBRIA 
Ue deal ooly vith closad economy mooetary equlllbrla. 
lhe Cl08ad economy non-ponetary equillbria, alven homogeneity 
o( aaeoto vlthin bordera. uould mean each agent aettina aa 
coosumptlon bundle thelr Initial endovment vector, alnce they 
cannot trade vith anybody. For th. cloBad monetary ecooomy: 
~oonumer's problem: vill be identlcal to (4) vh.re vo 
17 
lUlpoae 111'1 (t) = O tor con8UIlIer i, and \lher .... eh a,,_nt tacen 
& country-specific 1+r,,(t). The 8a1ll8 tor th_ 101tial oId. 
0.tlnl1100 5: A Competitive Honetary Equillbriu~ vlth 
Partfolio Atltarky H1EPA) ¡a ••• t oi •• quene •• ~ P,,(t), ",,(t)} 





E.eh coneu ... l' af aflnel'atioo t l 1, country h. 
.olv.. thtilr optlplzation problem •• ntlonad 
above. 
0ld at tl~e t:l 80lve th,ir trivial optlAlza-
tion probhm. 
80th J'Ilool •• are valuBd. l/P,,(t) > O ... 11 h.t. 
HarkAta elear, perlod by p.rlod, (or both 
eu['rencioJi8 
From (lll) 
( 7 ) 
l+r,,(t) 
The absence o( the "dominance result." (5), llllplleo that 
~111 not neces3arlly be constant. 
Note that the exchanae rate does oot play any role 
In the prlvate aaent's opti~at cho~ce, since both COQntries 
18 
It l. just ao ab-
etractlon. th. relativa prlce of both monl •• , vher. th,re ia 
no PMrket avallabl. lor 8uch ao exchanat. Ab.tnce of auch • 
~.rk.t mak •• th, concept of "flexible exchanae rat.," vacuou •. 
On th_ other hand. tht iovernaenta do not na.d to .et • 
"path of exchanae rat ••• " .loe. their dom •• tic aonetary 
palie'... cho •• n independentlY, viiI pin down Pft(t), and 
there{ore th_ ratio. Hene •• th. concept "{!xtd exchanae rate" 
i. aleo v.cuoue. 
D,Cinitloo 6: A Stationary Coap.titive Hooetarv EQuilL-




INCENTIVES TO INflArE IN AN orEN VERSUS A 
ClOSgD gCONOHY, A rRElIHINARY DISCUSSION 
U. can •• al1v identi{y th, clo •• d tCOOODV wlth th, 
portfollo autarky real •• and th, OptO econoDV with th, _00.-
tarv reai.e vithout r •• trlctlon •. 
A. atotlonad before, •• eh aovern •• nt car.. oolv .bout 
th_ veltare of ita ovo r •• id.ota, (lo thi. ea.e, the utilLty 
lavel aa80eLatad ~ith the ateady atate alloeatloo). 00 thft 
other hand. the govero.ent can only i~po •• tax •• (or ¡iv. 
mon.tary tranaCera) on tho.e r.aidente. In th. clo.ed econo-
.Y. th. aovernment can ooly afteet th,Lr ovo re.idaote. In 
th, apeo econo~y uodar fixed .xch~oAe ratea and no capital 
controla. the governaent ta able, in equillbriu., to atfeet 
th. re.ideota of tha othar couotry by vay ot printlna Dooey, 
and alvina it •• traoet.re to th.lr r.aidenta, whLch ~ay 
exchaoae it (or aooda at Ph(t) (L •••• aive it to (oreLanera 
vho vaot it.. • atore oE value) or keep it the&.elv ••••• 
atore of value vho.e caturn t. lovar, in real terpa, the 
hiah.r the vorld-~Ld. Lntlatlon. Under 80.' conditlona. 
ba8Lcally 00 the diatribution 01 endo~ment8. tha dietortion 
created (Io~.r return on •• vingo) viII be compen.atad by the 
aaioa of th. trano(era reeeivad. rher.fore. i! that ~ere th, 
caee. Lt vill pay tor the aovernment to do 80. Sy •• etrically 
the aovernn.nt could tax and dellate (one ffliaht th1nk oC the 
¡overon.nt colleeting taxe. in money. and deatroyina 1t, or 
collectioa 1t in the torn ol aood". and exchanaina it tor 
money to be de.troyad). Uhat mattere here ia hou doeo the 
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¡overnmel\t alleet th~ ~orld money eupply (world 10(lation) 
and the tranpEoro/tax •• impo •• d on their citl%en •. The kay 
la that in the abatnce o{ capital controla _nd with fixed 
exchaOQ8 ratea. th. (r ... l) purchasinQ pO'JU' ol ~tion8. 
to the maney stock ~.Y b. poaltlve. Thl. opena the po •• lblllt~ 
al the QovernJlent u.loa tloney creatlon ... ao optlfflal vay ol 
flnanclna Ita real dalle!t. 
In the publlc flnanee 11terAtur8, one ol th. maln re.ulta 
la that lu~p-,uM texatlon, lf co.tl •••• l. beat. Uallace (29) 
has .hovo .. v4relon ol .ueh • propo81tlon, In th. oo. couotrV 
maoetary .q~lllbrlum vlth a conetant .onoy 8upplV and lump-uum 
the delicit btlne (tota11y al' partir) Ilnanced throuah (lat 
lIloney 18eue. 
Jt turna out that ~hen yo~ conoldel' a t~o-eount~y veralon 
ol aueh a nOdel, and if ~ exchana4 ratt. prevai1. there 
vlll be an incentive for that country'o aovern~ent to ereate 
llame d18tortloo, Le., Cinanc. th. deflcIt, at leaet pal'tly, 
throuQh Ploney ereatlon. Ue oo~ present ao exafllple ~h.re the 
governllleot ~Ill choose partly (or totally) to monetiza depend-
loa 00 ite couotry'. re1Gtive (aod on th_ daficit'. relative) 
alze. 
21 
and cAll money ere.tioo in 1: 
The "overn.ent ha. to choos. tito parametera PI" (the 
proportlon o( expendlture (inancad throuah M.lanoragt) and 
p,T (the proportlon 01 tha .xpandit~re ralead by tAxes). 
problem yi.id the (0110w10a (Irat order eoodtion.: 
(6) 
11 1 tr } P",(ttl) P,(t) 
For a monetary equllibrium, (6) Ylil hold wlth equallty, aod 
toaether wlth the buda_t con.traiote it yieida the followina 
individual h a.vinas 
k=l~j (m"'(t)/P.(t» -t 1"'(t) 1/2(~;,,(1-lhT» 
From th. lIlarket clearina conditioo (or the above aaareaate 
aavinao, 8um~ina over h, 
ti I (t) .. eH~ (t ) 
1/2( lJ u(1-PI') .. V1j) '" Poet) 
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Uaio" "J(t) "" ",(t-l), alnc8 IlJ" .. O, ve can 8olve: 
.. li-r= 
vhere ve callo, .. 
te taxat!on) 
,"" I ( 1- a I T ) ...... , J - 2 .... t I PI" .. 
" .. O-PI') ....... t~ 
p,. 
p, ' Q lIt r .. 1 (no dietortion) p.{ 
1-0.,(21),"-+111') 
l-(l,PI' 
00 th~ contrary. lf th. aovernment compltttlV .00.t1& •• : 
Note that _xi.tenee requlr •• l+r >0: v. are Qoina to 
aa8u~e that th_ environ •• nt .nd th. aiz. oí tho doílclt allow 
(or a ~onotary oqulllbriu~ to oxl.t ovon in tho c ••• oí 
completfll Dlonothatlon, L •. , 1-2cxlB. ) O. (Tho doUclt aannot 
bo "too biS"). 
Choice problem for 8ov.rn~ent 1: a combination of 
(p,n.B. T) auch that the at •• dy etata utility of the repreaon-
tativo aaent of country 1 ie maximizad In th. corr •• pondina 
atationary competitiva monetary equllibrium. for •• llv, 
max U¡(c,t(P,T,B."),c.,(P,T,IL"») 
a.t. p,Hi-p,T;;;B, 
lt'. LQPortant to •• pha.l%. that P, 18 nR1 a choice variable, 
(lt 1t "'.re, PI .. O ,",ould _lvaya b. th. coic~ In this .et-up) • 
and th.t PJ • O (th. other country 18 pa88ive). 
For th. apeclfled utility (unetlon. aivon th, conditions 
af a monttary equl11brluR, th. objectlve functlon vl11 be; 
Th, (lrat-arder (Khun-Tucker) conditlona yield th_ (0110...,10& 
(a) For th_ interior 801utioo 1l,".P,T ) O 
b) For th. cornor 801ution. P," : PI or PI' ~ p, 
Th~ íollowlna 1 •• ture8 ahar.eterizo th. opti~&l choice 
tor the aovorn~.nt: 
alven PI. and the phvalcal environment (in thia caao, th. 
relativo aize of the country i). 
Then, the tollowina can b. easily shown: 
QP,"- 0p,T-(1) ~<o. ~> O, ceteria paribua, th. biaQer th. 
deilcit, the biaaer propartlan a( taxattan in the optimal 
packago. 
(JI ) 00~) 
, @«i O. th~ biQQer th. country th. 
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eoaller the optlmal monetlzatlon. 
(lli) tllp'· o a80.1 l. (Uallaee's case. Cloaed 
Ecooollly) 
Ue nov pr •• ent thr.e numerical .xampias, .ach one repre-
sented araphlcally lo Fiaurea 1, 2, and l, re.poctively. For 
thoso .xampl.a, G = iL\l11' iL '" 0.2, "'il=y=2. 











txamplo 21 Tvo couotrleB, ldeotlcal (0.=1/2), 90dowmente 
(2. Q). 






















0.1 0.1 0.80 0.65 Optlmal 
lhe ex~~ple9 are ehoseo .uch that tho lirst tvo yl.ld the 
corner aolution .aa optl,u,l poliey, the la8t one a 50-50\ 
copbinatlon. Cloarly the vellare ••• oelated vlth • taxatlon 
.cheme doeao't chanaa from ao apeo to • clo.ed aeooomy. 
"Fiaeal" polleiaa hare are not trana~ltt.d (slnca th.y are 
oon-di8tortionay). Ooly .onetary pollai •• are ne4atlve)y 
tran81llitted. lo aurUJlAC',., lor thé c •••• describ.d In theme 
.xa.ple •• endowmenta in tha .econd poriod are zaro in both 
countriea. (i .•.• both r.pre.entative consumera hava a .trona 
de.lra lar a.vina (or "hlah tolar.nc. lor 10fl.tloo". if you 
wieh». then. whpt matter8 io thle CA8G t. the relatlv. 01z& 
of the count~y and th. relatlve .lze oí tho d.llclt. 
The blaaer the couotry (the dellclt), the blQ"or the 
proportloo ol tax •• In the optlu~l pollcy package. U~\lAce'. 
ca •• would be the llmlt ol thl. ca •• , wheo the country i. 80 
bia that 1t'. the only ooe (elo.ed .cono~y). 
The ea.e where portafolio rest('lctloon are i_poaed 
(capital controle) and flexible exchanae rate. hold, la 
oqulvalent to th. cloaed econom~: e.eh country 8u((er. lrom 
lt8 ovo ¡nflAtion, aod i. laolated lrom tho others, aiocé the 
.xchan~e rate wlll refleet aoy deviation lrom the arovth of 
the total vorld money aupply. Ther.tore the portlollo autarky-
flexible exchange rato caRe la jU8t the cloaad .eoooMy caao 
vhere z&c'o 10flatlon (complete taxatlon) is the optinal 
pollcy. 
26 
lo the next Section ve conaider the caS8 ol ths ~ 
¡overnrneot, inatead of beina pa •• ¡ve (In th_ above example 1t 
v.a actually non-exiatant) lotoraete by choo.loa th. be.t 
policy aiven th •• etlon ol ita rival, and e.eh oo. 18 lookinQ 
(orvard to th. veleare level ol thelr ovn citizena. 
o 
one country 
,lope at H: 
,Jope at T: 
Ffgure 
(1-2ii f)Y (l-iif)y 
(y,O), af' 1 
45' 





tWQ identical cQuntries (y,O) 
"i = 1/2 
1 -1 
,Iope at H: TTr' 1-~j 
(complete núnetfzation) (optim.l polfcy] 












o 1L-----------(:':1~_2:-a...,t B~t C)y"-(-l_iit)Y 
two eountrtes (y,O)(O.ly,O), al' 0.9 (eountry 
H: complete monettzatlon 
T: complete taxation 
o: opttmal poI tey 
vory big) 
~ECTION IV. NAS" EOUILIBRIA 
!Y....L. INTRODUCTION 
Given th. incentive to us. ~on.t.ry polietes In an opeo 
economy \/lth a llxed exchan". "ea1"8, 1t la lPu .. dlate to 
•• tabllah a non-cooperatlv. aam. In vhich both playere (tha 
aov.rn~.nt. ol e.eh country) anaaaa In chooalna from a aet ol 
reaimea and pollcy par.metera (atrateav epac •• ), and ~ho •• 
outcome (payoff f~nctJon) la aalna to be determIned by th. 
combinad, .1multaneoua &et10na oi th. players. 
In thIs 50ctloo \le con_ida" th. Nash Clgullib.rl.~ concept, • 
In IJhlch e.eh player tak •• Ita rival aet10n •• aiven. Qnd 
vh.". a 81tuatloo 1_ re.chad in vhlch 1t do •• not pay for 
81ther player to devlatt Iro~ .o~. aetlon taktn. glvtn th. 
aetloo 01 tht othtr. Tht payoff oC plavere 1. golna to b. the 
eteady atat. utlllty ltvel oí • reprt.entative gen.ratlon. 
The a.~e l.. ata~ on •• and any dvnA~lc lnterpr.tation to 
the MrtActloo functlon." 01' ba.t rtapon.. corre8pondenceo ot 
each pl~ver ~uot be t_kan cautiouoly. 
u. divide the analyaio in !b~~. accordlna to the 
choice oC realmeo that \/e .. 110\01 in ea eh otrateay .pace oC the 
playere. 
1n the firot game, callad th. ~on.tarY-r.8trlct.~ aA~ •• 
\ole allo\ol only the ~onetary realme to preval1 In a \Jorld vith 
parCeet currency aubatltution. Each aovernment muat chooae 
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tro .. a ett ot parameter. co~patible vith a Coppetitiv, Hdoo-
tAry Equilibriup (HEF). ¡iveO the .ctloo_ ol th. oth.r playero 
The ranao ol parametera for which • vorldvlde loflatloo ia 
compatIble v1th • "ooeta;Y equi1ibrlu. 1. aoloa to be deter-
aod by the comblned actloo ol both playera. Th,relore, lt 
could voll be th' ca •• that, ¡lven the actlon ol one 01 the 
playera, tho ranao ol parametera lrop whlch tha Qov_rn~.nt 
may ehooao ia .uch that lt ,uy .nd up In • lo",.r payoff thao 
belore havlna acce8a to th_ aalle (the utility a •• ociated ",Ith 
the orialnal endov .. ent v.ctor, lor inatance). Thia makea thia 
aape not very loteroatina In lta.ll. Ho",.ver, 1t provea to b. 
a u •• lul input in poaterior aam •• , a. ",,11 aa ln throvlng 
in.lahta on the best r •• pon •••• ln th. ~on.tary rang., ol 
eaeh player d.pendin¡ upon th.ir r.lativ. aizo, endow~ent 
atructure, etc. The optimality 01 the outco.e ol thie gama l. 
atudl ed aa \Jell. 
In tho .econd ¡am., callad th. unrestrlctod aamo. th. 
choice ol the non-nonetary realm. beco.e. avallabl •. Thla la 
a regime, a. indlcAted io S.ctioo 11. vher' lIIonio8 are not 
valued, yet th. private aaeota al diflerent eountrioa can 
en¡ase ln barter trade. Tho choice of the non-pon.tary raaioe 
can be roodellad in tvo vaye lor •• eh al tho play.ra: in ooe 
taahion, the ehanaa ot realo. can be made at aoy otaa' ol th. 
aaPla. In the other, the playera aolve firat the mooetary-
restrieted game, then compare th.ir outeome vlth the one 
thoy could ¡et by the choice al the altornativo reg'mo and 
docidé, ln th!a ca8e, lt can bo ohovn that, both are .trate-
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glcally equJv~lent. In thl. ,,~II. ve analvze under .... hleh 
circulIstanees la the N8ah oquJlJbriulI ¡olOa to bo oo. reaim. 
or the other. •• vo11 a. tho optlllalitv of the outco.e. Ue 
alao inveatiaato the acope lor loteroationa! coordloatlon, 
that la, vhethor th.r, exl.t jointlv •• de chale •• ol para-
•• tara that can maka both pl.yer. battar oll thao the outcone 
of the non-cooperativo a •••. 
lo the thlrd game, call.d the .xpanded aame, th. cholc. 
01 thft portloll0 autarkv reala •• e d.lin.d io S.ctioo 11. 
becou •• avatlabl.. Ue aoalyz. und.r .... hleh circu.etanc •• doe. 
the availabl. choice b.com. the optlon al th. playera. U. 
al.o .tudy th. optlmallty ol the al~ocatlon aoeoelat.d wlth 
thi. outcome, aod linally. "'. dl.cys. th. ecop. lor ~ 
"ationa} coordlnatlon. "'hen countrle. can u •• capital controla 
a. a way to laolat. themaelvee froa the loelliel.oci •• trana-
rnltted throuah the Ilxed .xchange ratea re¡lpe. 
In vhat 10110u8 I vi11 coo.lder the aimplilyioa a •• ump-
tlon8: 
( ¡ ) N~ ; 1, h D i,J (on. individual per aeneration 
In oaeh country) 
(11) U(C1~,C.~) = C'h c. h , h'¡ • J 
(i 11) G~(t) ; O all t. h~i,j 
.The latt.r a6sumption vill reatriet the aovornment 
choice to only ono parameter, alneo troro (2) thQ budaet 
constralnt o( the aovorn~ent w'll become: 
( O) I1 h ( t) - Hh ( t - 1 ) P..{ t) - fl"(llv,,,(t) 
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Then, by chooaina a P~) O. the aoveron.nt chao ••• A 
level of taxo. &nd vlthdraval oE .oney Eroa clrculatjon 
(delh.tloll) and by chooalna Jh > O the aov.rnPl.nt chooae. to 
inllate and 81vo trAnater •. 
Oneo e"eh aovero"eot chooa.a • poliey r'aln. and • 
.llov 





problon dop.ndina upon th. reaipo, a. d •• crlb.d In Soctlon 
JI, and aome oqulllbrlum 1& &chiovod. lho at.ady etat. utllity 
lovol a.aociat.d wlth thi. oqulllbrlu~ ~lll b. th. payoll lor 
.... eh Qovtrnmant. 
For th •• peel1lc ca •• oí th, Statlonary Co~petltlvo 
Honetarv Equl1iLrlum w1th p.ríeet currency eubetltutlon, 
there are tva vaya to paraneterlz. th. pollcy ehole.: 
(1) 10 chao., a .'gueoce ol nonln.l ~on.y ere.tioo, 
Nh(t) z ph(t)M~(t-1). Given th. narket atructur., thia d,t.r-
~ioe8 th. 1+r(t) m 1+r .equenc •. Glven th. initl ... l eonditlona, 
it pina down the aequene •• p, (t) p, (t) .0 that the 
playera can compute the real tr ... nalera/taxa. to th,ir resi-
denta and dateraino th.ir atoady atat. utllltv level. 
(li) To choose a sinale paramater, P~. 01 real ~onoy 
creation, -Phw1h. such that. tho mark.t clearing condltion, 
which embodi.a _aenta' c>ptlralzation, determine. 1+1', aud 
a¡ven that tho tax/transter fteheme le aIready In real torma. 
-:13-
lt follova th.t th •• t.adv .tato utlllty l,vel can b. compu-
t.d. 
In (27) I ahov th_ equlvalonco ol both wava to aupport a 
Statlonary Conp6tltlv. Honet .. ry Equl11b~lun. lh. at.tlon~ 
condltloo 1. crucial 101' auch .. o equJv.lonc.: lt lnplleo " 
conat"nt r"te ol 1nlfatlon. and that ."ch player vIII chao •• 
a conatant rato 01 real Donov arovth, ao that thoro la • 
.lnal0 choIce el Phi lnat."d 01 .. aequenc. Ph(t). Givon the 
oqulv.lence, lt vil} b. Dore conventent to u.e the •• eend 
Approach throuahout the oxpoaltlon. 
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filE NAS" EOUILIBRIA AMONG fHE MONEfARY EOUIPBRI"; 
¡HE MONEf"RY-@ESfRICTED G"NE 
80th countrl.. are torced to ehoo.e a pOlley rule taht 
la conaletent ~ith the •• lntenance ol the .ooetarv realme, 
aiyen the aetlon oí the other, no .atter ~h.th.r th. oulteo ... 
18 vorae thao tnl utility a •• oetat.d vito th. non-uooetarV 
, 
raai~., or Iveo tO. utility ••• oeiatad vith tnllr in!tt.1 
undee uhicn a monetary equllibrium eX!.ta. 
A nece.8ary .nd Bul(iclont coodition lor a aarket equi1ibriuu 
U. vllI call (9) tha "maximum seienoraAe cooditlon", aod 
1t 8tatea the upper bound (or aood. that may be ralaed throuah 
f1at ~oney creatlon, beina cooalataot vIto tne exl.tence of a 
monetary realme. 
Uhen Uah : O. a}l h , tha maximum .elanoraQe cooditlon 
rouet hold ulth strict inequalltVI 6<0,. io arder lor (l+r»O. 
The interpretatlon fu clear: tne aovernmanta eannot ralaa. ill 
i 
/~l 






_aareaate, uore aooda than the ooee av.ilable in tha eeonomv 
and atill mainta'n a monetar~ equillbrlup. 
the combined etfeet on tne vorldvide rate ol return (inver.e 
of rate ot intlation) i. al Ven by: 
(JO) 
The re.der can verlty thla expreualon tro~ ~e~dina the 
proot ot Lem~a 1 in tne Appeodlx. 
The GAne: ihere are t~o plaVera (aovernmenta) eoaaaed 10 
a non-cooperative aa~e detJned by 
(a) etrateQV opace for aovernment l. S,(P~) 
S la the ",ot oí poa.lbl. pairo oí policV parametera (Il •• flJ) 
(or ~hlch a atatlooary aonetary equllibrium (HEF) existo. In 
Fiaura 5 ve preaent ao oxampleo( nov S looks l¡ka. 
lo the Atrateav opaco 
plaver 1. alven the actlooe o( J. 
In Gamo Theory literature (seo, (or example (20) or (22) 
not standard that the atrateQY apace dependo on tho 
act'on~ o( the rival. Re(ormulatinQ our otrateay npace in a 
vay conslatent vith the standard eonYention vould aenorate 
prOblema oi contiouJty oi tha payoí( (unetioo (tor the pairo 
that break the monetarv equilibrium). u~ do oot uso any 
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exlatlnQ reaulta fro~ that body 01 literaturo, and ve viII 
flnd convtnient to 11mlt ouraelvas to th. AboYe strat.eY 
opace. 
(b) PAYOf( lunctlon: UdP. ,Pd (or playe" 1. 
Und.r a MEF, v1th tho.e 
I 




'" .,- (vil(l-PJ) + 
Ca .... cidl-+-r). 
v" 
l+r(PI.pJ) sol ve. (10), to b. payolf (unetloo (O" l vhen j 
Analoaously dellne UJ (PI ,PJ)' 
Dellne RI (IlJ ) Ara ~ax U.(PI,PI) 
PJ E S.(PJ)I 
r •• pon.e o( player 1, alve PJ' Analoaoualv deClne RJ(OI)' 
D~flnitlon ~: A Naeh ~9ulllbr1um lor tho reetr1cted-
JIIooetary aalue (NE-H) 1. a palr (l. ,P,,) E S auch that al ·E 
R. (P,) aod P, ER J (P.). 
Proposltloo 1: Let "'11 > O. all 1. Let \lH+",IJ h/"+",.,, 
Then there exiate a Naeh equilibrlum lor the re.trlcted 
monetary aame. Horeover the HE la unlque: Rh(P~) • p~ a11 h,k. 
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lh. proof is in th. App.ndix. The Exiatenct proof lollov8 
A lixed polnt typt of .rau~ent. 
Debreu (~). lh •• ain dl111cultv vae to prove quaslconcavity 
01 the payoff luoetioo, 10 order lor th. be.t re.pon •• corre.-
pondence. to be vell-delined. The payoll functlon 1. not 
conCAve everyvhore. "ovever, lt 1 •• hovn that lt 1. atrlctlY 
conCAv, vhere th. FONC are ... ti.Ued. 
di(ferentiable, qua.iconcavity lollow8. Another dilliculty 
"'lth the prool vaa that lor (PI.PJ). (1,1) the"e la no 
_onetary equllibriu •. There S l. not cIo.ed. and the payoil 
fuoctlon. Are not continuou •. A tranaforaatlon 01 th. set and 
the payoCC Cuoctloo. had to b. u •• d In order to apply the 
.. bove Tnoore(lll. 
Then, there 1. no N ... h Equl11brlud vlth zero lollatlon. 
The ldaA 1. that 11 oo. couotry playa conatant Ronatary 
pollcV. th. other ",i11 .lvava hay. ..o incentive to 1nllate. 
Horeover, il oo. couotry re.pondo \11th dellation to AO expao-
a10nary uonetary pollcy oC lte riVAl, ao th~t the flnal 
eCCect la abaence ol dl'tortlon (zero iollatlon), th.re .111 
be an lncentive to the expanalooAry couotry to lurther IIIone-
t he. 
lhl, Propo.ltlon la i~portant aloco it lmpllea tha! the 
Na ah Equil1brlum ol the non-cooperatlve monetary aam. can be 
domihated. 
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tenda to _ eero lofl_tloo equllibrlu., whlch 1. aleo the ~ 
of rtturo of th. noo-aon.taI'Y eq,ul1ibrlulI uh.o the AaareaUe 
(lrat perlod endow.eota equal th. a.eond periodo Houever, lo 
th. lillit. the re.ultJna alloeation 1. the noo-lIonttary 
equ1l1brlulll alloe.tloo ooly if v" • v .. , w" • Vu (,Jnd 
th. lnttrpretatlon l. tht (0110\lloa. A. tht world d •• Ir. 
for •• vinaa dlfllnl.he., th.r. 1_ le.. roo. lor the aonetary 
therefor. a .lIaller inflation:will be , 
.chleved uoder th. N.ah aolution. lo th. ll_lt, • %.ro 10f1,,-
tJoo NE lo the outCOPle. Such ao outCO"e la the non-~ooet.rv 
aolutlon ¡¡ both couotd .•• have no d •• 1re lor •• vlna, that l. , 
(P, ,ñ,) .... (0,0) on1v ¡¡ " .. . "e • and w" • W.J' 11 the 
countrie.' endounent dlffer, the NE \1111 b. • &.ro inUatlon. 
oS" 0, but p, < ~ O, p~ ) O or vlcev.raa.. Ue .hioll .e. lioter 
that th. country of borrouera \01111 end up all throuah thla 
aame 10 a b.tter po.ition. and that vill be th. ca.e 101' the 
lIPlit altua.tloo a. u.ll. 
Propoaitlon 2 10dlcated that the NE uii1 never b. al a. 
~.ro lnfla.tlon (and therefore deflatiao) typ •. That re.tricte 
th. locatlon ol the NE to the band 11mlted betu.en th, bound-
ary and th. 0-loflation l1n. ol S. (S,. Fiaur. 4). 
Ue can nou fttate the auboptlm.llty al th. outco~. ol 
Figuro. 
Strategy Space for the Case (w11.O)(W¡.1,O) 
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thi. aam •. Th!. 1. lottr •• tlna io ordtr to aoalyzt th •• copo 
for loteroational Coordio.tion. 
In a,o.ral, lo ~ oon-eoop,rAtiv. a ..... th. N •• h outco ... 
i. not Par.to Optl •• l. ",produclna th. Prleloot"'. Dil," •• 
par.dia •. Th1. viii b. .1.0 th. c ••• COI' th •••••• tudi,d 
her •. 1I0\IV.v.r, •• \l, .hall .ee In a h,t,r .t<:tlon, thh \1111 
not n.c •••• rllV b, the ca •• ~h.n v. _llov Cal" a rich.r .tra-
Propo.itlon 31 Tha Ilon'tary-ra.trictod HE i~ oot 'arato 
OpU .. a1. 
ve can alvaye find a 
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fta.lbl. allocatioo, pr.f,rr'd to this on., by t.kioa vithin 
•• eh country, E, froll ell, aiving E, to old for .11 t ~ 1. 
Ue haY' ch.raet.riz,d th. ..10 r •• ult. conc.ro1na th, 
outco., of thi. aa •• : ,xl.t.ne. and uniqu.n •••• lnflAtiona"y 
.olutlon, euboptl •• l alloeAtion. 
Othtr f.atur •• r.aardioa th. NE of th1. a ••• l. that th. 
" .. axi_u.. ..Igoor.,." conditlon le n.v.r .xhAuat.d (that l. 
th. r •• trlcted aoo.tarv NE J •• lvaye in tha iot.rior al th. 
.trateay apaea) and that 10 .qul1lbriu. th ••• vinaa of both 
couotrl ••• re .qual. Th" happen. no .attar th. .h.a 01' th • 
•• cond perlod endo\l~aot.). Thl. cao Qive ue.n ideA 01 hO\l 
ita 101t1al po.ition. for" eountry of ·borrov_~. VlJ < 
" ~ the othar eountry (that l., P,)O, p,<O). 
Th.n 1f a country i ••• d. 01 borrow.~, lt wlll hava. 
b.tttr poeition In th. aam •• Tha country of lender., in order 
to pr ••• rv. th. hiahe.t r.turn on •••• t. for th.ir eltlz.n. 
vl11 d.fl.t. (taxlna and r.ducina thelr ovn aooay lupply,. 
10varlna th. worldwld. rat. of lofl.tion) vhila th. country 
of borrow.r. k •• pa 10flatloa. 8.ttl08 aooda IroA ita riv.l 
(.loee th.ir .xtra pi.ee. of pap.r ara .til1 axchang •• bl. tor 
a ooda ln th. vorld •• "kat) and low.~ln8 th. rata of raturo 00 
•• vinal. 
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of b.lna th •• th_ on •• who takt advantaat of th, pot.ntlal 
aaLn. a •• oclate4 vith th. tLx.d .xehana. rate and p.rf.ct 
that la, th. on~ that haa • "hisher de,lre for •• vina" wll1 
.nd up in a lavar .fter-tax p.riod .ndou.ent, th.t i. vill ba 
lt 1. al.o. "aam. of ••• 11 vereua bia", lh, r ••• on 1. 
that th. *~.ll.r th. couotrv. th, l ••• "ootic •• ble- eff.et of 




(Aaaln fOr for •• l proof of the •• featur.' ve refer to (27». 
it vill inflate lara_Iy ln ord.r to "ot aood •• whil. th. 
relatlv.lv b1aaer au.t play th. oppaalte. 
IV.l. THE NAS" EQUlblDRIA AHONG HONETARX ANO NON-nONETARX 
EQUILI8RIA, T"E UNRESTRICTEO GANE 
Ue vill nov allov th, non-Monetary real.a to be a .tra-
ehov'that for th. non-aon.tarv regl •• th.re 1. a pure para.e-
ter atrat_ay. that l. if a aov.rnaeot choo ••• the non-aonetarv 
real.e. then the opti.al poliey 1. to do nothlna, (Ree.ll 
that here the Qoveroaent can ooly u.e "fiecal poliey", that 
1_ p~ ~ 0, .loc. noney ha. no value), 
lo~~a Z: L_t G~(t) • O for both hzl,J, Th.n Ph .0
1 
l. 
the optl~al paraa.ter polley choice under the non-aonetary 
re"h .... for hellJ, 
The Oame: Glven that ther. 1. a unlque optl~al polley 
under th. non-monetary real.e. ind.pendont of eaeh ather'. 
aetiona, ve can nau define th. aa •••• follou8: 
(a) Strategy spaee for Qovernment i: 
s, 
""here S,OL) i. the etrate¡¡y 8paeo far the Plonetal'y-regtricted 
aame, aod a,NH i. arbltrary in the 8e008 that it eould take 
the (arm o( any PI that "bre.ka !.hL.!lYotern". that J.8. arate 
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ol mOnoy ereatlon that le nat coneistent ~ith a .tationa.y 
competitivo monetary equjljbriu~. aa~e and a** tha aame lo two atope: 
a. whoee NE alven by (PI ,PJ) oxiet. and i. uoiqu •• a8 ehovn 
Final1y, note th.at St (PJ) depriOde 00 the ,"cUoos o( tlle 10 P~opo.itioo 1. and an unreatrlcttd aano a**. In etrat.aje 
rival, while a, dooe not, 1.9., "'e can ",h/aye chao •• a al 
the choIce of th. oth.r C'ouotry. payo{f tabla l. aiven by 
(b) PaY-off functlon for Movernmeot 1: th •• te",dy etate 
util1ty levol of couotry 1'. rteidente achiovod throuah th. 
poI ley taken (rom S, I .ith.r th. utiIlty ",.eoci.t.d w1th HEF 
(if the outcora. le to .tay io the mooHary rtaime) or tha 
utillty af the nan-mooatary alloeatlon. For_ally, 
11'0 latter ~i~ply etatee that once the monetary ('eal~e 
le broken. it la .0 (or botb countrles. 
Oeflnition 6: A N.oh Eguilibr!um from the unroetricted 
aame will b. a pa!I' (al-' p,e) E S U~(aJNH,oJI101)~ B.t. 
(01' all PI E SI 
Aa ve mentioned bofore, ve can break thl. aam. lnto a 
strateaically equivalent two-atep aape vhlch vill be eauler 
to deal vlth .nalytically. 
DeCine a* the aame where the non-~on.tary optioo 19 





tha follow!na .ay. that at least one ol th. countrleo. 
pre(eI' the Naah-Mon.tary .olutlon to the non-~on.t.ry equllL-
briuPl: 
~ -Lernma---1: U",(f)¡ .BJl > U",M" for at l ... at On. h. 
Ue ahould b. a littla carelul in interpretlna th. ctloice 
(PI<.n",NH). The aovemunt k chooa.e a uequence {M"ct)l vhich , 
(al' a conatant ln(lation and conatant real poney arowth 
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co""uponda to • unlque ~", "'hen l/P,,(t) ) O a11 t. The 
choice cp .. ,a~~") corre. panda to aove"naent k choo.lna .ueh • 
nominal •• quen~a, vet l/pet) baco.lna • O, and the non-aone-
tary rea1pe prevailina. Here the ••• u~ptlon ol printlna money 
beina co.tle •• h.ppen. to be cruclal •• lnc6 othar"'i.e a louer 
p~yolf ",ould hav. to be a •• laned to .uch cholce., end the 
atrattal cal .qulvaleoce al both a •••• a. ",ell e. the pro c", 
for obtalnlna p.rleet Equilibriua Irom .llainetina do~inated 
atrateaiea vould not hold. 
p.rfect Egul11brl. 
the for •• r aam •• pecitlcaclon. 
Ue can char.et.riza NECaa.) in the (0110",ioa uay. Let, 
- ~ 
uithout loee ol aeoaralit)' U,Cp, ,f),) > U,"". lhen 
NE(a llll ): (CI,"",OJ"tt),(O,.PJ) if U,(P"P,»uJ"n 
(a, M" .aJ""), (P, ,OJ"") 1 f U, (ir. ,ír, )<U,"M 
(al"",a.l""),(P, ,PJ ),(P,.o,J"") 
if UJ(ñ,.PJ)cUJH" 
Aa \ole have aean, ther. are mu1tiple NE in a··. \h vill 
find íotereatina, ao It la u8ua11y done 10 Game Theory litera-
ture, to atudy reflnameota o( th. Naah ao1utlon. 
'he 
Ooe VQy to do thia le to foeua on Perfectoeau, that la 
, 
equi1ibria reached by vay of elimioatlon 01 domlnata~ 
atrataQiea. 
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H.re th, proce •• al eliain.tion of domlnat.d .tr.teaie8 
i. ",ell d.llned becau'e the entry in th. la.t col~.o end rou 
of the payoff a.trlx al aU corrupond to a!..!.@!.! value for 
eaeh player: the .t •• dy .tat. utillty al th. non-monetary 
reaiae. Jt', eaay to build payolf tabl •• vhere thia vould not 
be true. Thie 1. the rea.oo vhy lt 1, lmportaot to .~ph.oize 
runtiooed above. 
Ue nou etudy P.rlect Equllibria, (PE), In aH. 
Propoaition 4: There le a uniqut Perfect Equilibriu. io 
a··, un1e08 u .. (?r, ,P,) • U",Mtt for .ame h. 
~: Fram Lemma 3. U.(~J ,PI) ) U,,"" for eom. k. lhen P. 
la a dominant .trattay for player !S.. Let U~(P ... ñ.) ) U .. "M tor 
h-k, then (P .. ,¡-.. ) i. th. unlque Perleet Equi1lbriua. let 
U .. (P",.P,,) < U","M, tor h\tik. Then (a .. H".ll .. ) le th. unlque 
Parfeet Equilibriu •. 
Noo-mooetary ver8US ~onetary NE 
Previouo1V ve charaeterized the re8trict.d-~ooetary NE. 
No\ol \ole campare the outco.e of oueh a aame with tho ooo-.one-
tary a1locatlon. Ue do 80 io order to aoalyze uodor \Jhich 
canditlone there vll1 be 8vi tch, due to one pI ayer. to the 
u~ f irat au~mari&e the main featurea relatins to both 
equllibria. Reeall our a •• u~ptlon. 0, > Olt ~ O. V'h > O. botl. 
h. 
Non-~onetary 6guilibriuffl 
I 1 ) 
(11) 










8. ( )"" •• J ( )H" = O (rurket el e.rina condi-
tloo) 
I<r • e t f".-,s.V > 0, 2(0,.6) ~. 
" ( • .,¡ ) > O 
00( • ~ (v, • ~ (I-p, ) - w .. ( 1+ fP) 
(8,( ) • 8J( »)(~r) = 1\ 
Ud ) = (v" (1-Pd - ed 
¿ > O 
Note that lí VIt •• VI' = O, lhen, the Períeet Equllibrium 
of the uore.tricted aame v111 a1vaya be the "onetary outeoRe 
(13 • • al), aloee (lH) and (lv), \111' '" O Ylelde 
!-etnma 4: IC both countrlos are identlca1, the Porteet 
Equlllbl'lum oC the unrestrleted 8a~e vIII .1..,aye be the 
monetary outcome (P. ,P,). JC one country la made oC borro~er8. 
"'It. > \1'1' And (") O-P,)1t (i-r) <9* __ thon the Pe"f eet .,
Equllibrlum oí the unreotricted aame \1111 a1vaya be non-mone 
-49-
tary. (Condltlon (*) reCera to countries' endov~ent. not 
beloa too disparate). 
Propoaition 5: The P~rl.ct Equilibrium ol the unrea-
tricted aame 1_ not Pareto opti~al. 
fr0oC: If the outcome 1. Naah-monetA"y, .ee p"opoa1tion 
3. lf the OlltCOI'U 1. non-lfIonetarv. l.,,"" 0. "0,-- < 1. Thertll 
{O", ao ideotical ar¡ument appliee. 
borderlio., 000 for .ach p1aye", io whlch it can be .1the". 
Ifovevel', fol' GOat of th. env1ronmeota. the non-~onetary 
raglme la moat 1Jkely lo prevall. 
1 nov presaot a humarJcal example. Let's fix, arbltrari-
1y, the eodovftente oC couotry 1, Vi ¡ (1,,1'1 ,ve,). Ulthout 1088 
oC aenerality 1et ..", > V". 1hon let's atudy the outeOIlQ oí 
tl\e Ilonetary ro¡Jnte aod contpare it to tho non-Ilonetary allo-
catloo. Ue viII analy%e. then, ¡Iven ~'. whieh v~ ..,il1 uake 
the aame end up In a oon-~ooetary realmo (eith." becaus. or 
j declded to ewJtch) or th. monetary ooe (becauet both ot 
them preíerred th. pon.tary~Na8h solution). 
Ue can deClne three realona reaardina the p089ible 




Non-Honetary Versus Honetary-Ilash 
country J a~ltche. to the non-aonetary real~e. 
country ! 8vltchlna to the non-monetary real.e. 
(111) ReRion 111: Jo ~hlch U" (PI .P,) > U"H", both h 
Notlce that Realon. 1 and 11 do not overlap¡ that la, 
there la alvav_ at lea8t one country preferrlna th. monetary 
outco.e. (Thls l. trIvIal In • vorld. where In _aareaate. 
firet period endovment are l.raer than •• cond p.rloda) . 
• 
In F1aur. 5 th. three realon. are grAphed. far th. Vi I 
(2.1). Realon 111 1. Juat th. unahaded are •. 
Reglan L: Country J 8wltchlna to th. non-monetary realme. 
It OCCUra when couotry J l. r.latlvely bJaaer thao 1 and wJth 
relatlvelY a.me d •• Ir. for e.vloa. lhe blaaer the countrv J. 
the more tranaf're to country 1, the more likelv to 8witch. 
The abillty of country to taX J dependa on J'. desire for 
savlnas. Therefore. JI and 1 are similar in .ndowments 
alza. but j has a etrooaer d •• ire for savina. th,o the more 
powerful vlll I be io taxina away thelr eOdovmenta, th.refore 
th. more lik.ly J 18 aalna to switch. 
~ion 11: depicts the conditions under uhich 1 prelera 
the non-lI'Ionetary raaime. In aeneral lf J la a net borrower 
(U I , ( We, " 1 will switch to the non-~onetarv real~ •. This 
aeema couoterlntuitive at liret elance: vhy ~111 • countrv of 
lendera prefer a non-monetary reaime uhleh provid •• a louer 
return, uhll. th. borrovera vould rather atlck to the hlaher 
lntereat rate monetAr, realme? The expIanation 1. In th. 
eompllcated payolla r.aardlna the abJllty of aettina tran.fera 
(or beloa taxed), and the uellare lo •• a •• oeiated uith 101la-
tlon, for eaeh eountry. lh. borrover ha. relatlvel' Dor. 
dlalik. from th. monetary realme ver.u~ th. non-Donetary 
beeaua. of th. hlaher lnter.at rat ••. Yet, th.y are to be th. 
bJa vlno.ra from 6xploitlna th. flxed-exehanae rate Dooetary 
aama for tVQ reaaooa: 00 oo. hand. th., are abl. to "et 
hlaher real trann(u8 {['om the couotry of lendera, whleh wUI 
mor~ likel, mAtch an, loflatloo vith dOmoatlc taxatloo (P~ ) 
O) Jo arder to keep thelr •• vioas' return. 00 th_ other hand, 
a hlaher rate al ioflation .eaos louer returo lor thelr loana 
for the borl'ouera. 5tl11 the, viII oot explolt their advantage 
to the 11~lt (that l., th. "maximu~ aeJMnorage conditlon" 1. 
hot blndlng under the HE) becau8. throughout the aonetary 
game ducribed above th. aéUU 2.2..!:.r~ \/111 .nd up beina 
B(tt-r-tranelera lendera (alnce e, ( ) '" ej( ) > O). 
Reaion 111: 10 aeneral, the !!2..neta~ l'.8aillla ",111 pr$va!.!. 
in the lolloulna three cases: 
(a) II both couotrlea are vel'Y similar, both io endo~-
meote, aize and lo destre (ol' aavlhQs pattero, that 18, In • 
nelQhborhood 01 1011. (This ie an extenaioo ot L.~~a 1 it both 
countrles are identical the monetary reaime prevail_). 
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(b) If the eountr, whieh 18 re1atlvely ~ore al !~ 
i. aleo l'datively larMer in firat period endolollllent •. l.e., 
uhen th. b1a eouotl" ha. alao a atrong da.ir. for eavina 
relativa to the 8,.aller one. (The caae (ut! ,O)(W'iJ ,O) vill be 
lncluded lo thla c •• e). 
(e) le both eountrl.a have b.aleali, th. aame dllecreoce 
In andounenta, but tha blaaer the eountry th. DOre d •• lre for 
aavina (that la, • "4&' plua" 11ne throuah ~I)' Thla ie th. 
araa that aaparate. aealons and JI, and aeta .maller a. oo. 
U. hava ahovn that th. outeo •• ot th. unr.atrlctad aaae 
la not P.O. 
Ue nov conaider the cae, vher. both Qovernaeote. ioatead 
ot chooeioa polieie. io a non-cooperative vay, •• ke a joint 
deeJ,ion that aAy i_prove theJr payo!l (vellare level o! 
their citizena) a •• ocLated vith th, non-cooperatlv, aolution. 
The Icope tor that cooperation bthavior 11 Itudied, that l., 
the .xl.tenee ot Jolnt atrateQle. that yield a better outeo.e 
than the N.ah eolutioo for both eountire •. 
lt ahou1d be noted here that a. lt le uaual In the 
literature concernina uaya to achieve Pareto Superior outeoae. 
to the Naeh aolution, th.re l •• que.tion of hoY to lMplement 
these eooperatlon echap... The problem la enloreeabllity. 
sinee there 1. alwaY8 an lncentlve to devJate fron the aQree-
Ment. On. ~ay to aet around Jt Ja to vrite a contract Jn 
whieh playera miaht be penall%ed In devlatlna. A dore 8ophia-
tlcat.d \Jay to aet around the enlorceability problen ia to 
aenerate a R~peated la~e,(.ee (22) lor example) \Jhoa. non-
cooperatlve aolution ls the coordinatod aolution ot the 
statle aame. Ue uill not tocua 00 the implementatJon problem, 
but rather in shouina the exiatence ol coordlnatlon ache~ea 
no matter th~ out come ol the unre.trictod aa.e. U. viii a180 
(ocus on eharacterlzina hO\J ~hould that coordlnated pair 01 
policiea look 1ike dependina upon the endo\Jment atrueture. 
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D.tinItion 7: A coordina.tlon ~ h acheru 18 .. ".ir (PI ,PJ). 
Jointly decIded by both playera, aueh that, 
( ¡ ) 
(e'Ph.l+r) beina a coppetltlve mooetary equilibriu~ (HEF). 
ioequality for at leaat eo.e h, end vhere (~l·,PJ·) repre.enta 
the Na.eh equilibriu. of the unre.trlcted aa.e (.ee Oetinltion 
6) • 
Ae belore, we dIvide the ana1yale lo tuo parta, ooe 
reaardina the ,cope lor coordination vhen the outeo.e of the 
non-cooperative aame 1. the monetary ooe, the other when a 
oon-monetary reai.e prevalls. 
Caae 1: Uhen the NE Ja the Non-HonetarY 
;.;.: h=l. 
A coordJnatlon aehetu (íL .íL) \Ji11 have to tultlll (1) 
(PI ,í1J) E S, that la (la) 'ji" s 1, all h. \,11th atrlct inequa-
lit Y lor sone h. 
call that th. caae u., .. O torced to impone atriet 
inequallty, but thJa vil1 not be the case her. aince th. 
outeOllle ol the Naah lame uJ 11 alvaya be ~on.tary vhen u •• ¡;: 
0, )' 0. 0-.--- -0-,--' \Jith atriet inequality for Gome h. 
COI" a11 h, Then 
~ .' (P •• 0 , ) = (0.0) le a eo~dini'tion achorne ..... h.n th. Parl.et 
Naah outeome i. non-mon.tary. 
followlog. Uheo couotrl •• ' endowm.nts pattero .atlafy (11). 
lt ~ean. that thay hava a .imi1ar "deeire for eavlna" .truc-
ture. 
In aeoerAl ~> 0, > v,. o.- "'-'-'-. Il 
"' .. 
h .trallar. ~ 
w .. 
.... 111 be cloae to ~ and .0 to ~.' >1. 
....., ~. 
> ", uiU hold 
-¡¡;- for both co~ntri ••. Thon 
"do n~1blna: vill ll.ve th.m aa lood.. before play in; thAt 
aame ulth the auboptlraal rloult. Jl th_re 1. dlaparlty bltv •• n 
couotrlee' endovrneot diatribution, th. eountry uhich l. 
rel.tlvely more 01 a borrover vi11 Aore likelv benefit (co~ 
the lover market intereat rate ataoclated \11th tha oon-~oo.-
tary reair18. 10 8ueh • ca •• a re.rranl.~8nt ol the vorld 
equi llbrltllll \,hat leavea .aeh country on th .. 1r o\oln. Play Jlaka 
the~ uorS4 olf. un1488 80m. tranaler pay~ent 18 sent. In that 
case (0.0) eanoot beat the non-monotary real .... 
lt can be ahovo that beacuoe ol aaareaata _ndov.anta In 
the lirst perlod belna laraer than (or th ••• cond. condition 
(11) must hold COl' at leaet ooe oC th. eouotriee. Th. follow-
Ina atates that .... heo th. eondltlon (al1. to hold lor oo. ol 





Lu (~)' ( 0, 
..... , -0.-- Let the NaRh aolution be 
Let (a .. íL) b. a HEF Bueh thu 1 UJ (PI .ÚJ) "" u, "'" 
\ 1.1 ;o: 1 
~ .. ,. 
aod let (11 •• P,) be a nEF .ueh that{ U, (a • • 1l~) 
1+1" • 1 
Th.o .. p, < 
~ p, < o. 0< P. < '11, ond «()"iL). .. ,. <P •• P,) 
(P.("). P,(") \lher. P.(.) • .P. , (1- ",)a" • 0<. < 
that l+r(p) • 1 a« coordlnatlon .eherus. 







e = ~ (a,t.'o")tP, '" " ~ P.' ~ (1 .. p, t B,t s 'P, .and uup,t + 
\11111" = O}'e th. Det of o inllati~~ coordinatlon eehemee 
vh~o the outco~e ol the non-cooptratlve aame le non-monetary. 
Note that thera .xiata a contiouum 01 lOflatiooary and 
dellat100ary coordloation .eh_.ea a8 vello 
Propoaitlon 6: The coordloatloo acherne •• ~bodied lo e 
are P.O. 
Pro~: All thl conditlon8 oC 8alaAko-Shell theoraN (1) apply. 
theroCor6 1+r = 1 1mply optl~ality oC th. reaultlna alloca-
tlons. 
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Cas~ 2; Uhen the HE ia Mooetarv 
Call (u .. (it. ,a.,> the utility level. aaeodated .... lth the 
NE(íl. 10,) tor country h. 
Clearly ~, t a-:.. t 8';, t ca, = Vil t Vil t VtI 
aince 1t ia a co~petitlve aooetarv equilibriu •. 
No..., tak~ the .. 110cat100 (Ct"~II)(~1J,CIJ) auch that Un 
Ú~. all h and ~th ~ ~.h lor all h (this would be equlvaleot 
to ao equilibrlum \11th ltr = 1). lhia alloeation dae8fi't 
fulf!11 the market elearioa eooditloo. that ia, 
Thio vaa araued io Propoaition 4 when ..... ahol%d th~ 
noo-optlmalitY of th'l t1Iooetarv Nanh equilibrlul1l. It .... 100 aho,",o 
that there io ao a110catlon that i8 P.S. to it. jU8t by takio¡ 
tl,e difference betlo/een tho aQQreaate endovmente aod the 
-!:>9-
allocation (é, •• :',) (c~J I diatributlna it 
taahion amona the reaidentea ot either eountrv. 
Althouah the alloe&t100 (é1l.c~,.c~J.c~J) cannot be 
supported throuah .. coordloated choice (P, .P,) aloce It io 
oot.. MEF, lt provide. roo~ for exi.tene. ot & goordloatlon 
~ a •• tated In D.tinitioo 7. 
Lemma O: Let the outeo., 01 th. Naah aam. b. moaetary, 
(PI'P,), 
Lo< ~ ~ (tll'P,) b. il MEF 8uch thilt Ud " UI ( ) = U' ( = (ol) 
Hr . 1 (bl) 
~ ,. A v U, ( Le' (P.,Psl be a MEF auch that U,( ) = U' ( ) • (04) 
lt~ = 1 (b4) 
t(l-p)P ... O (p ( 1 •• ueh that ltr(p) z 1 are Soordinati9fi 
scheJQ,a. 
Prapo.ition 7: A coordlnatloo .ch,.e .l .... av. exl_t •. lh. 
Proot follov" direetlv trom the previoua thr.e Leam"s. 
Note that, lo aeoeral, eountriea aareeina not to do 
anVthioa le oot a eoordioatloo acherne. 1I0vever 1t can be 
ahovo thAt, uoder 80me e ••• o. thAt 1,1111 be the ea.e. lo parti-
cular, j{ both countries are identlcal, (0,0). h • eoordina-
tloo aeheme. Jo Fiaure 6 .... e preoeot other envlronmoota tor 
1>\ , whlch (0,0) la a coordlnation acherne. 
" \, 
eountry o( lendera to the eountry oC borroyere, th.t lo the 
eountry oC borroyera 1nilatina, th. eountry oC lendera deflat-
lna. 
In Fiaur. 6, ye divIde Realon 111. the re4100 for vhich 
a Plonetary-N.eh le th. outeoPle 10 t\olO .uh"'a100"': 
B..!.a..!.on lit-A. 10 whieh the _ndowelent pattern (deatre lor 
e.vina) ia niailar and where the Plonetary-Ua.h Call_ In 
behl8en both "non-monetary "8g11'11'" area •. In the 1II1ddle ol 
.uel) a reolon there vIII be ao area eueh that (0,0) l. prt-
'erred by both to the N.ah outeome. (The (0,0) arta le eo 
emall that lt look. llke a 110e, but lt actually ha. 80l'lle 
poaltlve he.aure). Further lrom that are. 80me tranalere are 
needed to ~alntaln Azaro 10l1_tloo vorld equillbriuPI. the 
More ve pove to tlle lelt (country J PIare ol • lender) the 
~ore tranolere requlred lor 1 (the vlnoer 01 the lIIonetary-
Naah) and vice veraa, 
Reilon 111-8: At the lelt ol the non-Plooetary realoo (01' 
player J. 10 whleh player 1 takes eveo ~ore advantaae ol 
Ilim/her, aod therefore uould have to have Bore transfera than 
auch a coordinatlon acherne that beata the non-.onetary o~t-
come. There(ore, 1t la not surprioina that we oaonot flod 
(0,0) as a coordlnatlon 80hame in .uch an area. 
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Figure 6 
An Example of Environments fer Which (0,0) is. Coordln.tion Se heme 
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IV. 4. lilE NASII EOUILJ8klA AnONG TIIE 110NETARY, NON-110NETARY 
ANO PORTFOLlO AUTARKY EOUI L1DRIA: TIIE EXPANDE O GANE. 
In this •• etion w. allow lo~ count~les to use a richer 
sot o( choice. io their non-cooperative aa~8. 
BeCoro, they vire decid loa betwo.n .vltchina to a 000-
monetary raalmo, in vhich goveroaenta 10.0 their abillty to 
attect the velCare of their citlzona. or malntalnina the 
mooetary reaime vithout capital controla, .nd vhere aoma 
equilibrium level of Donetary choic •• va. reaehad. 
No .... ve allou them to lmpos. 80"0 reatrJctlone on thelr 
holdinaa 01 Coreian aa8eta and on tho prlvate Jnterna.tlonal 
borrovlnQ and l~odina ftar~et (capital cantc'ols) 
The v.y ve model thio reotrlction io by allovina each 
country to "410 on theJ r ovn". that Je. 
citJzens from holdina forelan curreney as a atore of value, 
~ to not allov prlvate loano betueen fteftbore oC dlClerent 
countries. 
80th reatrictiona, .... hen iRpO.od jolntlY , relax th. 
condition ot equal equilibrium ratea oC returo tor both 
montes. There can be domloanee in rate ol return. yet each 
country may hold their ovn currency. Lat U8 a.au .. e that only 
the firot reetrictJon ia lmpooed, lor eaeh country. and yet 
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prívate interoatlonal bo~vlna and lendina la permltted. 
Then, both .onlea roturo have to be.t le.at .a big a. the 
private loano rate, and otrictly equal il .ueh a garket 
aattera at all. Ther.ear. thero vould not b. any ditterence 
between impoalng that ro.trlction and tho lai •• ez-(alre ~eaime 
otudlod aboYe. 
Aa ve ehoved in Seetlon 11, the impooltion o( ~ 
reotrlctlona, eallod "portlollo autarky" (PA), in which both 
countrie. &0 on thoir ovn, allow (or dlllerent equilibrlum 
ratea oC returo in each country, and Cor dlCCerent uellare 
levelo than tho •• of the moootary and non-ponetary Naah 
.olutlona atudled prevloualy. 
Ue fJrst ohov that there 10 a pure otrateUy Cor thio 
reaime. that la. lf a aovernment chooaea the portCollo autarky 
realme. then the optilnal pol1cy parameter lo to do nothina. 
Optimal SOVernfflent choice under PA: Each aovernment's 
objective viII be the eteady etate utillty level, that la 
ch008e 0', to 
18,\)[ U.(O".) -(\01'1(1- 0'.) + 
where th. aaents' optlmlzation requlred 
(7) P..(t+l) P" Ct) l+r~(t) lor eAeh h. all t. 
The market clearlna condltlon aa8oclat_d ",ith a MEPA, 
and (1) yield 
or (12) 
Any u. consiatent vlth (1), 0I01l0Y be10a valued, muet 
aleo vert(y the l-country vera Ion o( the "maxlmun a.isnorase" 
condition. that la 
t 1 3 ) 
-6~-
uher. rl( 0',) (0110"'. (12). 
Each aoveroneot vIII choo.. VI io order to ~axi~iz. the 
ateady etate utlllty level eubJact to (12) and (13). The FONe 
are: 
~: U. o;: O i. th_ optlmal choice (or mon~t~ry 
polley uodtr a fA r_alme. 
Proof: Let u, o;: Ot Then (1+r.}=1. But (or a "EPA, "'u ! 
.., ••• there(ore (13) holda. 
Aleo al( ) • ("".-ue.) and lt can be ahovo that r t , 
\I,.-Va, 
.0 the PONCs are .atia(lad. 
From thé .ioale-valuedo.as o( U.(OI), a, - O 18 th. 
unlque eolutlon. 
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Nún-Honetary~ibrium Und~r PA: Fro. th. previous 
Remark the payof( (unction a •• ociated vith th. PA .teat.aY 
chojce beCOPle8 
L," .. 
uhen there i. rOOM fOr .. MEPA, th.t l. uh'n 1.r, • 1 a 
Uhen > 1, th're l. no MEPA, but v. can .tlll define 
• non-tnonetar'y equilibrlu"" in vhlch 1 t " • ~ and U,"A 
" .. 
) '" v" "'., . 
level ae.oclated vith the noo-aonetary equilibriu. of th. 
cloaed .cono~v la auch th.t th. con8u~ption a110cation equala 
the .ndovtnent allocation (00 room for trade acro •• a.nerationa 
or betv.eo countrie.). 
B.fore v, form.lly defIne th. a.~e V. ahould ~,ntloo that 
onc. the port(ollo re.trlctlon. are lmpoaed In oo. couotry, 
they have to be lmpo.ed lo the other couotry. that la, th.re 
c~nnot be .8y~~et.tc eatpital controla. 
ASQYmmetric Capital Controle: In (27) ahov that i t 
one country playa PA (that la, lt doe8n't a110w Ita reeidente 
to hold loretoa noney) th. other country muat a180 impoe. 
restrictlooa on holdina (orelna currency, or ele, hava th.ir 
aaviOil;! beina taxed ...... v. Such a aituation happ.na .... h.n \Jlh > 
(or both h. Jt V1~ < Vlh. one-aid.d r.atrletiooa are 
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me~ninal~8s, .lnc. countey h vould be condemned to th. non-
moneta.ry 
lendina vlll (orce them to thei. autarky-endovmeot .lloc~-
tlon, independently of \/hether ttle restrictiona eU e "000:-
The Expanded Game: Ue Can nou define th • • xpanded M:~me. 
uith th. portfolio &utarky cholce .a folloue: 
(a) StrateAY .pace for pI ayer 1. S. 
(.Od "do nothina") and U."A r.presents 8vitchlna to the 
port(olio autarky reaim. (.nd "do nothina"), 
(b) Payoff for e.eh plaver are represented In the follo\l-
lna payoff .atrlx: 
Monetarv Non- Aonetary P. Autarky 
Monetary UdíL ,Pd ,UdíL ,iL) ul ... n,UJNN U,"", UI"A 
Non-tr\onetary UINn,U~Nn U 1 Nn. U J Nn \1, • • ..., •• ,uJ ... n 
P. Autarkv U," A, UJ "" U."",\JIJ .\I. J U I " A, UJ ..... 
6H--
The nev cella added vheo fA optioo ie introduced require 
.o~e explanatlon. 
Clearly, if both countrie. play PA, the re.ult1na outcoma 
",111 be (U,"",U J ""). If one country play. PA and tha other 
playa ponetary,the iatter ",111 ach1ave the PA velfare (lode-
pendently 01 vhather oC' not a dome.tic ~onet.ry equilibriu. 
can hold) alnee th. country 1_ lelt on their ovo, In terma o! 
private 10an8, and baeau.e ol vhat 1_ arguad above, It hau to 
alao l.p08~ eurrency 1n8ub8titutabillty (lC av.llabi.). 
le one country play. fA that ahuta do",n the prlvat. 
loene m-.rk.t, th. othe" coootry pl.yina .:'non-Ji\onet .. IY"': i8 
jU8t Ach1.vin~ th. ut111ty as.oelatad vlth thelr endow~nnt8. 
Ue vill ehov that, contrary to the uore.trict.d aan., 
here th. p.ir (non-aonetary. non-monet.ry). cailed (Q¡"".aJ"") 
vill naver be a NE. In the unre.trlcted aam_ lt v •• ~lwav. 
the c •••. 
Ue lirot ahov some r.m~rk8 charaet.tl~ln8 the payoff 
aaaoelated vith d1lferent atrateales. 
Then ve proceed to ahov that lo aome ca.e. th.r. la .. 
oolque Naah Equl11brium .aaoclated ",1th thla aame, vhich 
happee lo be th. Portloll0 Autarky r'al~e. lo any other CRoe, 
the payolla RS80ciated ",lth th. Nneh Equilibria viII atill be 
the onea oC the Portfollo AutarkY realffl8. 
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FlnallY • ve atudy the optimality oí auch ao outco~e and 
the 8cope (or loteroational Coordlnatioo ~heo the autarkic 
reai •• beco.e. avatl.ble. 
Givan our ••• uaptioo 9, 
~ithout 1088 ol atnarality. 
~> 1, 
" .. 
Than, it tollo",a i._ediately that country 1 v111 never 
play noo-monetary a. ba.t reapon.e to J'. plYioa fA, alnce ~ 
(V1l + "'a.). ) Vi. - V ••• and U."" 1 Vt. v ••• \11th .trlct 
lnoquallty lf countrl •• are not 1deotlcal, alnee 
. ( It 
.quailty holda). 
• e • 
-0.' 
Oefore an.iyzina the po •• ib14 NE of the exp.nded Qa~. 
vlth PA, ve now compare diflerent payolf v.lue. under difler-
ver couotry wouid alv •• y be better off under the reattlcted 
R.!~: Let Vt. ) Ve •. Th.n th. payof! a880clated vith 
the PA ehoie •• 1. tha aame 80 th, (0,0) coordlnatlon Beheme 
payoff. Sinee. if v,. ) Vel' thflre exilllta a MEPA and 
Deflnltion 8: Given (v" ,v.,) define 
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that ia TR. ia the "eaion, Jn the .ndo~~ent apaC. ol (v" .v.J) 
auch that "country 1 n.ede. tranaler" that l., a (0,0) 
coordlnation eChtde ia not po •• lbl •• ince countrv i i. better 
In Flaurt 6, thh la th. area on th_ l..!.!!. ol the (0.0) 
coordinatlon eche •• art •. 
In that realon, alnc6 \11 0 
\loo 
(lhe Prool tollov8 (roM Pro-
poaltlona 2 .nd 4), 
Letntna 9: 
Let (""'J ,V. J ) E TR,. 
rhen (PA,PA)(PA,NH) are the UE o( the expanded aame. The 
NE la (PA,PA) i( ""'J ) "'CJ. 
Moreover let (""'J.V.J)(\oI"''''.') b. auch that a (0,0) 
coordinatlon echeme la poa.lbl •. 
Then (PA.PA) la the NE o( the expanded aa~ •. 
Finally, let (""J ,\le .. ) .. TRI .md (0,0) not b •• goordi-
natioo acherne. Then (PA,PA)(PA,NM) are the NE o( the expanded 
'lame. The NE iu (PA.PA) it \oI1J > veJ)' 
PropoBition 8: (PA,PA)(PA,NH) ie the NE ol th. expand-
ed 'lame. Moreover it la unlque, (PA,PA), ii vtJ ) v.,. 
The proof follo\l8 dir.ctly froN Lamma 9. The baaJe Jdea 
Ja that 1t vill _l""aya be th. ca •• that on. al th. countriea 
chooae8 PA, tha other not--b.eina able to do b.tter txc.pt v1th 
PA, unle08 \oI'J S ""'J Jn vhich caae Jt Ja indiiierent bet"".en 
fA 01' NH. 
Corollary 1: In th. ca ••• ""her. th. NE ol th. expandad 
la not unlque, \01'1 
the Port(ol10 Autarky "ealma. 
Propoaltlon 9: Let Vq < w.J. Then the NE o( th_ expanded 
aallle la not Pareto opt1mal. Let w,J ) VCJ' Then the NE oi the 
expanded aame 1. Partto optlAal. 
Ptoo(: For the (lrat parto (1'0111 propoaition 8, NE ",,111 b. 
(PA,PA), (PA,N") . 
Under PA. UJr~ e \oI'JV' J and, ainc. a 
MEPA, cannot exiat, 
) 1. 
But l*r, ~ 1, h~nc. equality oC Marainal Ratea ol Suba-
titqtion aeroaa coqntriee (or all datea ia violated. 
for the aecood parto (roll\ Proposi~ion 8, (PA,PA) ia tho 




The acope lor loteroational coordinatloo vhen PA l. avail~ble. 
SUMMART OF RESU~ 
Cao couot~lea oov do bette~ by aettlng together and 
~ ~ 
chooeloa some joiot (al .PJ) rather thsn beina on their ovn? In th1. Seetlon ve have atudied the N.lh lolutioo of • 
noo-cooperativa aame betveen two countrie. engaged io ao 
Flrat let "'" ) \l ••• \l1J > \I.J' Then. thera i. no 9<,ope inllation tax ..,ar over eaeh other. aiven that th, l!xed 
for loteroational coordinatloo. lt lollov. (rom th. Portlollo exchanae rate reaime and the abl.nce of portfolio re.trlctlon8 
Autarky (NE ol th, Expanded aame) belnQ Pareto Optimal. alv. both Nonetary &uthoritie. acee.. to th, ..,orld doney 
8upply. The pottotial advaotaae. of aueh policia. day be 
00 the othar hand, let V1J ( v., lor gome j. Then there partially or fully olfaet by the aoclal ..,.lfare 10.8 a880-
10 scope lor lnternational coordioatlon. ciated ..,ith the di.tortion (inllatioo). 
To prove it. note that v& can fiod poi ley cholets lmply- The analyals i. earried 00 in three atages. dependina on 
inA aoode boina traoaferred trom the borrover countrYI J. whether th_ .trateav .pacea ol eaeh pl.yer include ju.t the 
which la dolOR badly under PA, 10 order tor 1 to keep "open~ ~on.t.ry-lai.a.z talra real •• ..,lth pereeet currency 8ub.tl-
th~ internatlonal borro~lna and l~ndina mark~t. tutlon, or allov for th. non-pon_tary reaime to be adoptad. 
or In the thlrd ataae. I( the additiooal mooetary-porttollo 
lo particular. any (íL .íL) nueh that autarky realme optlon l. introduced. 
( i ) For th. (¡rat ataae, lt la .ho~o that ~h.n a couotry ia 
relatlvely • lender aod/or rel.tlvely blaaar In thelr (Iret 
perlod endow._nt., 1. the poteotlal loser ol the monetary 
(11i) 'il,(O BuC'h thé\t ~ (w,.(l-P')"vr.)· > ~ ( .... 1 ... W.')I!". aam~. lh. re •• on le that the smaller tl,e eountry (or their 
.. U.,. ... 
taxable fir.t perlod endow.ents) the 1088 notlce.ble effect 
00 the ~ lo(latloo thelr Mooetary polieie. viii be. and 
.... il1 be n eoordinatioo acherne lor the .... orld yith PA choice, the leas aoelal co.t intlation vlll have tor the., becauae 
• A 
aod .... here eountry J ~paY8" -u,¡P ... w'JP' lo order lor 1 to 
o( thelr olllaller des1re for aavina. On the other hand, the 
opon the private lendina/borrovina rnarkot. blaaer a eountry, the ftore e((eet thelr policie. 00 th. vorld 
in(tation rate, commonly aullered by both couotrle •. Alao, 
the more ol a tender. atructure, the more concero ahout the 
_74_ 
(inal returo 00 saving., and there(ore th_ .ore like1v to 
give in bv denatinQ, ... hieh p.e¡¡n. ippoainQ taxe. 00 o .... n 
residente and Qivlna trane(era to the other country in order 
to aet "hiah.r ",orld ... lde rata of returo, lo thit: ataa., ... e 
eho .... d .xiat.oc. ol a Uaah .quilibrluP. lor th •• ooetary aam •. 
lt la alao ahovo that th. P.ooetary-Naah equlllbrlum ia iof16-
tionary. therelore 8uboptlP.al. And .... h.n couotrlea are identi-
cal (or verv allll1ar) this aituatioo reproduc •• a veraion of 
the Prison.ra' Dil.pma reeult. 
Al10vinQ the option of the non-nooetary r'aim. doaa not 
improve mattera 10 terp.. of efflclency: io .oat of the eaeea, 
for endo~penta pattern. that are not vary cloaa, there vill 
be a avlteh bV the ralativelv lender or by the rel a tlve1y 
biaaer, to th. non-monetary rtaima, lhe envirOntunt wae 
ehollen ao that the non-lIlonetarv allocation can alvava be 
domlnated. the rate of return aa.oeiated vlth the non-monetary 
reQime vill be lovar than under any inflationary ponetary 
equilibriup, thua boina further ..... av from optlma1. 
Thi_ leaves room for atudyina joint choIce. of poliei •• 
that dominate the OUtCOfU of the Naah 801ution, that ls', to 
aoalyze the aeope tal" lnteroational coordlnation. Th. resulta 
are that. tor countriea vith similar endo~pent pattern 1 pean 
that the ratlo o( firat to eecond perlad endow.enta muat be 
similar, and decreaaiog as the {1~8t pe~iod endo~~ont8 in-
crease 80 thdt eftecta, 1ender 8tructure aod .ize strueture 
ollset eaeh other. The eountries are usimilar" in a(fectioa 
(beina a((ected bY) the internationa1 .eianoraao-4iatortion 
, -'15-
aape. For the r.st of the ca ••• , the cooperation .ch.me muet 
include pOlicy parametera that implv a real tranafer from ooe 
player to the other, the ooe .... ho i8 relativelv a winoer uoder 
the non-cooperative aane. io order (or the coordinated choice 
to be .ccepted. 
Uhen the aap.e vith a portfollo autarky optlo'l 1. intro-
duced. lt vl11 al ..... y. be the ca.e th.t at leaat ooe of the 
eountrie. decide. Qolna on th_lr o .... n. lherefore, lt turna out 
that portfollo autarky (lor_ioa exehanae cootrola and restrie-
tlooe to international borrovlna and lendina) 1. a Naeh 
equilibrium for all the poaaible endovmento eombination. 
Furtherpore, it la the unlque Naah equllibriu~ ... hen both 
countriea are lendera. lhi. fita the observed phonomenon ot 
countriea lmpoa1na auch re.trletiona In the hiatory of flxed 
exehanae rate realpea. Jt ~i11 aleo b. the caao that ~hen 
aueh an option ls lntroduced,the aane o .... itchea (rom one of 
borrowera to one of lendera, the latt$r becominQ the potential 
vinn.re of the expanded aame, The outcoroe Qho~n to be Pareto 
optlmal in th, ca.see lnvolvina t .... o eountriea that .re lendera, 
no matter tha relative aize and the endovment pattern. For 
the CA.ea in ~hich one of the eountriee ia a borrover, it 
vill be wlllinQ to aeeept joint policy choieea that iuply 
aomo aooda beloQ trana(erred to the other eountry, yet the 
couotrv o( borrovera preferrina this to the Portfollo AutarkY 




This paper pre.ente a model 10 whieh in a vorld with 
fixed exchanae rate& and aba enea of capital control., !l2.n:. 
cooper~ aamea yieId ~uItlpla N.ah equillbria vlth n2~ 
optlmal alloeatlona, vheo we Introduce real.e. (l .•.• ,lther 
the mOnetary or th_ non-monetary reaime) aa 8tratt81 •• lor the 
playera. 10 aeneral there i. a uniqu. Perrect Equ111brium for 
the aame w1th both .tr&tea1ea. lh. 8ub-optlmal1ty 01 the 
non-cooperat1ve 801ut10n provldea 8cope tor 1nteroatlona1 
eoordlnatlon, In the torm o( Jo10t choIce ot non-loflatlonary 
pollicas that dominat. th. Naeh equilibria a1locationa, 
Uhen th. p'ortfolio autark~ optioo 18 lotroduc.d as a 
etrateav choice, it beeolJlee a Nash equlllbriuo. ot the aame. 
Uh~o it ia the unique ooe, 
no room for cooperat10n. 1he tvo-country perfeet eurrency 
eubstitution lraroevork can be r.interpreted ao a alnale-eco-
noll'lV vitl, disperse pover to ereate deflelt •• ay in different 
lnntltution8, or autonOli'lOU8 eOll'lmul,Jtles, that take into 
accouot the velfare of 
vithin an econoll'ly. Thla 
coordination ot defieit 
vithin an eeonopv. 
a diff.rantiated 8ubaet oí aaenta 
paper vIII thua ahov the need ror 
policlea ol diffarent inatltutiono 
Nav direetione tor research should include ~~~a~ 
tions al the apeclfic a08umptlonn used throuahout, particular-
lV reaardina stationarlty and the apecilie Cobb-Poual •• 
preferencea. lt ohould also inelude a dYnatftic vera ion ol thia 
··77-
atatic 8ame And a diacounted tuture strea. ot utilities 
aubatitutlna for th. ateady .tate utJlity aa a payoft func-
tlon. It ahould alao take into aecount that ditterent QOVern-
meot apendlna pathe than the on. uaed her. vould require eaeh 
pIayer to face ao optlmal comb1oatioo ot .ooetary and (iacal 
pOliei •• , inat.ad ol the 'lnale para.eter choice presentad 
above. 
Finally, in arder to overturn the re.ult aboye that 
port(ollo autarkY raal~e to be the outeO.' of tha expanded 
aame, vhen ava1lable in the etrategv .pace, &ttentlon ahould 
(ocus 00 .odels that aeparate currancy froa other ••• aet8, .0 
that portfolio autarky la not equivalent to zaro trade balan-
ce, 8. 1t va. here. In auch env1ronmenta portfollo autarkV, 
modelled •• complete 1801atlon lrom each other, wll1 lpply a 





See In¡r&~'. (12) ol the event. ol the late 50'. and 
60'. re¡Ardina the eoll.pee ol the Bretton Uoods System, 
Cooper, (3) and (.), ha. analyz.d the 1 •• ue oí policy 
lnterdependence and the nece •• lty 01 eoordlnation in • 
broad an.lyele, 
Helpman and Razin, (11) compare alternativa oxchanae 
rate .y.te~8 in íramevork. vhere ¡overnmente' monetary 
polie!e. are passlve. 
4. Hamada (8) has ua.d a etrateaie approach to anaIyz. 
th.a. que.tiona in a non-optimizina íram.~ork and ~here 
the outcomes ol diííerent polieiea are not relat.d 
explicitlY to the v,ll-belna oí people. but to aeneral 
"de.ir_ble aoale" auch .e "price atabilitv" and "external 
balance". 
5. In an equilibrium fraftevork, in which countrle.' choicee 
are hodelled aa a aame, aeveral papera have .xamlned th. 
queation oí macropolicy and coordination. UalIae. and 
Niller (19) atudy coordination within a diflerent mone-
tary aame, while Keho. (15) and (16) examines a (iacal 
po ti cy aam •. 
-7Q-
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